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Abstract
Following a baseline session, human subjects were allowed to 
choose between concurrently available games contingent upon a 
fixed amount of bar pressing. It was assumed that the total 
amount of a dimension apportioned to bar pressing and game 
playing is conserved between baseline and contingency sessions. 
Conservation theory was shown to be moderately successful in 
predicting game choices. The results are also discussed in 
terms of economic demand theory. Elasticity of demand (defined 
in operant terms as the ratio of the percentage change in 
contingent responding per session relative to the percentage 
change in the instrumental response requirement) is considered 
as a function of the degree of substitutability of the 
contingent responses (games). These economic variables are 
discussed in relation to psychological choice behavior.
The Economic Effect of Different Reinforcers on the
Conservation Model
Thorndike's original law of effect has changed little 
since 1911; reinforcement is still defined as a procedure 
by which a response is increased in probability, vigor, or 
frequency as a result of the response being followed by a 
stimulus. Stimuli which have such an effect on responses 
are called reinforcers. Yet, this traditional definition of 
reinforcement has proved to be a problem in the 
psychological literature (see Mackintosh, 1974). For 
example, there is a degrees of circularity in this approach 
since the law of effect is not stated to allow a priori 
predictions concerning the ability of a particular stimulus 
to strengthen a particular response.
In a well-known article, Meehl (1950) suggested that 
the law of effect could avoid the circularity problem if 
reinforcers were transituational in their effects. Such an 
approach, however, requires a potentially prodigous effort 
in cataloguing the events which increase instrumental 
responses. In addition, many reinforcers work well under 
one set of conditions, but not under others (Breland & 
Breland, 1961) . Most researchers have preferred to
discover an event's reinforcing attributes rather than 
listing all events in some kind of "seed-catalogue" 
fashion. Consequently, several theories of reinforcement 
have evolved to distinguish the process of reinforcement 
from predicting whether a particular stimulus will come to 
control a particular response,
Huil.'.S, Theory af Reinforcement
Hull (1943) made one of the earliest attempts to 
resolve the issue of why and how reinforcement works. The 
crux of his theory rested upon physiological need reduction 
as the basis for reinforcement. For example, food serves 
to strengthen a response because it satisfies a need state 
of the organism. Problems with the need-reduction approach 
quickly surfaced when the reinforcement capacities of 
nonnutritive substances were demonstrated. For example, 
Sheffield and Roby (1950) found that food deprived rats 
would learn a discrimination task when the reward was 
saccharine. Such artificial sweetners are virtually 
unmetabolized and provide no nourishment value. 
Consequently, Hull was forced to modify his definition of 
reinforcement.
Hull's (1952) later approach replaced need reduction as 
the basis for reinforcement with a reduction in the drive 
stimuli generated by a need state. For example, an
organism's hunger drive gives rise to various motivational 
stimuli, (roughly speaking, the feeling of being hungry), 
the reduction of which acts to reinforce behavior. This 
tension-reduction approach would appear to be seriously 
undermined by examples of apparently frustrating events 
acting to strengthen behavior. For instance, rats will 
continue to traverse an alley for the opportunity to engage 
in copulation even when interupted by the experimenter 
prior to ejaculation (Sheffield, Wulff, & Backer, 1951). 
There are also reports (e.g., Butler, 1953) of animals 
performing a task in order to obtain the opportunity merely 
to view another organism confined in an adjacent cage. 
This action would seem to be due to drive induction rather 
than drive reduction. These and other problems have been 
well documented (e.g., Bolles, 1976), casting doubt on 
Hull's approach as the answer to v/hy and how reinforcement 
works.
Consumatorv Response Th&Ajiy
An alternative approach to drive reduction as the basis 
of reinforcement has been to regard rewards as responses 
rather than stimuli. That is, the act of eating may be 
considered a reward rather than the substance being eaten. 
This approach ascribes rewarding capacities to certain acts 
and the sensations accompanying them. The advantage of
this approach, relative to a need-reduction schema, is that 
the consumption of nonnutritive substances can now be 
considered rewarding. The consumatory response hypothesis 
faces serious difficulties, however, in the light of 
evidence showing that reinforcement can be achieved even 
though the response is by-passed altogether. For instance, 
a rat will learn to press a lever that leads to an 
injection of food (see Rachlin, 1976) or intracranial 
stimulation (Olds & Milner, 1954). Despite these 
drawbacks, David Premack (1965, 1971) has adopted the use 
of responses as reinforcers in his own unique theory of 
reinforcement.
Premack's ThSO&Y o£. Reinforcement
Premack's theory focuses on a hierarchy of responses, 
ordered according to value, that occur in any given 
situation. None of these responses have unique
characteristics. For example, reading a book, watching 
television, gardening, etc. are events that may be ordered 
on a hierarchy of value. According to Premack (1965) , for 
any pair of responses in that hierarchy, the more-probable 
one will reinforce the less-probable one. Hence, when an 
event more probable in the hierarchy is contingent upon the 
occurrence of an event lower in the hierarchy, the higher 
event serves to increase the frequency of the lower event
(Rachlin, 1976). For example, assume that watching 
television is more probable in the hierarchy than 
gardening. If the opportunity to view television were 
contingent upon gardening, the frequency of the occurrence 
of the gardening would be increased.
The manner in which the value for two events is 
determined is via a free-baseline situation in which a pair 
of responses are available to a subject free of 
constraints, excepting the availablity of time limited by 
the experimenter. According to Premack, time devoted to 
one activity and the other is proportional to the value of 
those responses. The implication is that any response may 
serve as a reinforcer or as an instrumental repsonse, 
depending on its probability in relation to the occurrence 
of other behaviors. Hence, this probability-differential 
hypothesis would appear to escape the problem of 
circularity inherent in the law of effect by designating 
the more probable response as the reinforcer. 
Nevertheless, an objection could be raised concerning 
Premack's assumption that the free-baseline procedure lacks 
constraints. Although the baseline situation may appear to 
be independent of constraints, the reality of being able to 
engage in only one response at a time, over a limited 
duration, is a very serious constraint on the free baseline
situation. The problems with Premack's view require more 
elaboration, but for purposes of this dissertation, these 
may suffice.
R.a?P.Qns.g Deprivation a M  Conservation
Timberlake and Allison (1974) have extended Premack's 
notion that responses serve as reinforcers. Their adaptive 
model assumes that instrumental performance is a conflict 
between freely occuring behavior and restrictions of a 
schedule. According to the response deprivation
hypothesis, a response will be an effective reinforcer if 
the schedule results in that response being suppressed 
below its baseline level. This relationship may be 
expressed as;
I/C > O./O^ (1)1 c
where the ratio of instrumental responding (X) and the 
contingent responding (£) must be greater than the same 
ratio when both responses are freely available. The terms 
and Qg represent the baseline amount of instrumental and 
contingent responses, respectively. If the subject does 
not perform the instrumental réponse as specified by the 
schedule, the amount of time engaged in the contingent 
response during the schedule period will necessarily be 
less relative to its baseline level. For example, a rat 
may spend three seconds pressing a bar (Q^) and 50 seconds
eating (Q^) during a free-baseline situation. Under the 
restrictions of a particular contingency session, a rat may 
press the bar for 35 seconds (J) and eat for 15 seconds 
(£) . Putting these numbers into Inequality (1) gives us:
35/15 > 3/50
which is true. This means that the definition of response 
deprivation is satisfied (inequality (1) is true), 
therefore the bar press response should increase over its 
baseline level.
The response deprivation hypothesis differs from 
Premack's probability-differential hypothesis in that the 
response deprivation condition determines instrumental 
performance rather than the probability differential 
between two responses. The response deprivation hypothesis 
places no particular importance on the position of a 
response in a free baseline hierarchy. Response X/ whether 
it ranks above or below Response % in the baseline response 
hierarchy, can serve to strengthen % provided that the 
chosen reinforcement schedule suppresses Responses X below 
its baseline level (e.g., when Inequality 1 is true).
Allison and Timberlake (1974) have presented an example 
of their response deprivation hypothesis. In one 
experiment, it was first shown that rats spent more time 
licking a .4% saccharine solution than a .3% solution when
paired in a baseline session. This baseline phase was 
followed by contingency sessions in which consumption of 
the .4% and ,3% solutions were the instrumental and 
contingent responses, respectively. The employed schedule 
satisfied the response deprivation requirement and produced 
an increase in .4% licking relative to its baseline 
measure. Contrary to Premack's position, this provides a 
clear example of a less frequent response reinforcing a 
more frequent response.
Allison (1976) has recently modified the deprivation 
approach, introducing the notion of response conservation. 
In essence, the response conservation model asserts that if 
the instrumental and contingent responses are considered 
together, the total amount of some dimension attributable 
to the two responses is conserved by the subject as between 
a baseline session and contingency session. As stipulated 
by Allison (1976) , the dimension conserved is actually 
unit-free; however, to promote understanding, it may be 
convenient to think of the dimension conserved as being 
energy expenditure. For example, if a rat were required to 
press a bar to obtain water, it may be that one lever press 
requires four times as much energy expenditure as one lick. 
Thus defined, the total amount of this energy dimension 
apportioned to this pair of responses should be conserved
across various reinforcement schedules.
Tests of the conservation model have employed a variant 
of the typical FR-schedule. In using what has been called 
a cumulative duration schedule (Shettleworth, 1975), the 
subject is required to engage in the instrumental and 
contingent responses for a specified duration. For 
example, a rat may be required to run in a wheel for 10 
seconds to gain access to a drinking tube for 20 seconds. 
Unlike a typical FR-schedule, the cumulative duration 
schedule requires the subject to engage in the contingent 
response for a specified period of time before the 
instrumental activity again becomes available. In contrast 
to a Fl-schedule, a specified amount of both responses is 
required. In short, there is a continuous cycling between 
the instrumental and the contingent response that requires 
the organism to engage in one activity for a given time in 
order to subsequently engage in the other. In the above 
example, upon completion of the instrumental requirement, 
the running wheel would lock until the rat drank for 20 
seconds, at which time the wheel would unlock and the 
drinking tube would be removed. The number of times that 
the subject completed the 1 and £ sequence in a fixed 
session length is the dependent variable (H),
The conservation model for a cumulative duration.
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fixed-ratio schedule can be expressed as:
N(kl + C) = kO^ + Og (2)
where X anà Q. are the instrumental and contingent responses 
specified by the schedule while and are their
baseline counterparts. The unit-free ]i parameter is 
defined as the amount of the dimension entailed in 
performing one unit of response i, relative to the amount 
entailed in performing one unit of response s..
To better understand the role of the k parameter, 
consider the following hypothetical example. Suppose a rat 
is required to press a lever for access to a drinking 
spout, and the dimension conserved between these tv/o
responses is energy expenditure. The k parameter 
represents the amount of energy dimension entailed in 
performing one lever press relative to the amount of the 
energy dimension entailed in 1 second of drinking.
Recently, the conservation model has been extended to
concurrent fixed-ratio schedules (Shapiro & Allison, 1978). 
The concurrent schedule allows a choice between two 
alternative fixed-ratio components. The subject has an 
initial choice of selecting either of two instrumental
responses (X^ or Xg) • Once this selection has been made, 
completion of the instrumental response will lead to the 
availability of the appropriate contingent response, ^
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or £ 2 * After the subject completes the contingent response 
requirement, as specified by the cumulative schedule, the 
choice between the instrumental response will be made 
again.
An initial choice of either instrumental response 
(e.g., 1^) excludes responding to the other instrumental 
response (Ig) and contingent response {Q.̂ ) until the 
requirements for (Component 1) are completed.
Component 1, having as the instrumental response
requirement followed by of the contingent behavior 
results in the dependent variable which is the number of 
times Component 1 is selected. Similarly, Component 2, 
with I 2 the instrumental response, followed by the 
contingent response, has ^2 the dependent variable. For 
example, a rat may have the choice of pressing one bar for 
10 seconds (1^) to be able to eat for 30 seconds (&^) or 
pressing a different bar for 5 seconds (Ig) to be able to 
eat for 15 seconds (Gg) • If one bar press response is 
chosen over another (e.g., 1^, 10 sec, instead of .Ig, 5 
sec) , the second component of bar pressing and eating 
(e.g., Ig + Cg) becomes unavailable until the subject 
completes the specified amount of responding on the 
selected component (e.g., After completing the
selected component, the subject once again is presented a
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choice between both components.
The model for a concurrent fixed-ratio (cumulative 
duration) can be expressed as;
+ C^) + Ngtklg + Cg) = kO^ + 0^^ (3)
and ^ 2  designate the number of times the subject 
executes the respective components. Again, k represents 
the amount of the dimension entailed in performing one unit 
of response i relative to one unit of response This
dimension is assumed to be conserved between the two 
responses across sessions.
To date, the conservation model has received impressive 
empirical support (e.g., Allison, 1976; Shapiro & Allison, 
1978; Allison, et al., 1979). However, the model has yet 
to be tested using two different contingent respones. 
Previous studies have used the same contingent response, 
varying only the instrumental response duration for both 
components of the concurrent schedule. Among other 
purposes, the present study is an attempt to fill this gap 
in the literature. The conservation model will also serve 
as a heuristic device, in the present study, to test 
applications of another theory— the economics of demand. 
Economics Applied Psychology
Recently, there have been a number of attempts to cast 
various aspects of operant choice behavior within an
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economic framework (e.g., Battalio, Kagel, Winkler ; Fisher, 
Basmann, & Krasner, 1974; Lea & Roper, 1977; Rachlin, 
Green, Kagel, & Battalio, 1976). A typical analogy 
consists of relating what economists call a demand curve to 
its psychological analogue. The demand curve relates the 
purchased amount of a commodity to its price. The obvious 
psychological counterpart is the relationship between the 
number of reinforcements obtained (quantity purchased) and 
the requirements of a schedule of reinforcement, e.g., its 
price (Lea, 1978).
Despite these similarities, the analogy between price 
and schedule parameters is not without complications. One 
difficulty in extending operant principles to economic 
terms deals with the kind of schedule used as a price 
analogue. A fixed-ratio schedule requires that a subject 
"pay" for a reward by performing a specified number of 
responses. This kind of schedule is not translated easily 
into a money analogue in that the subject operates under 
lesser budget contraints by being able to generate 
responses at will. Money, on the other hand, can not be 
generated in the same manner as bar presses; hence, 
responses "paid" as a requirement of a ratio schedule are 
more easily replenished than is money spent. Typical 
concurrent interval schedules are an ineffective analogue
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as well, in that the time spent engaging in the 
instrumental response can be counted simultaneously toward 
the completion of two schedules. That is, as time passes, 
the moment of reinforcement advances for both schedules and 
time that is counted toward the completion of one schedule 
can also be counted toward the completion of another 
schedule; hence, there is no effective budget constraint.
The conservation model offers a solution to the 
foregoing price problem by utilizing the cumulative 
duration schedule. This type of schedule makes the budget 
constraint problem more tractable. Since any experimental 
session is limited in duration, a schedule that requires 
the subject to engage in a response for a specified 
duration avoids the budget constraint problem of the 
fixed-ratio schedule. Furthermore, by limiting the 
subject's responding to only one response at time, the 
budget constraint problems of an interval schedule are 
circumvented.
It is suggested that the procedure of the conservation 
model offers possible alternatives to make for a more 
straightforward analogy between economic and operant 
principles than has previously existed. Economic demand 
theory may also offer equally important contributions to 
the advancement of the conservation model. The question of
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how the conservation model deals with different reinforcers 
can now be viewed from an economic framework.
In economics, the functional relationship between the 
quantity of a commodity that is purchased and its price is 
measured by an index known as elasticity. Elasticity (&) 
can be defined as:
e = -( A, Y/Y)/(A X/X) (4) .
This measure reflects the amount of a commodity, %, 
purchased in response to a change in price, X. The minus 
sign in Equation (4) ±s inserted to make the elasticity 
number nonegative. It is assumed that a rise in price 
positive) will lead to a fall in quantity demanded (&% 
negative) so that the numerator and denominator will be of 
opposite sign (Baumol, 1972) . Elasticity is usually 
expressed as one of three categories: unit. elastic, or
inelastic. Unit elasticity is demonstrated when a 
percentage change in price, X, results in an identical 
percentage change in amount of X purchased, thus leaving 
total expenditure unchanged and the absolute value of s. 
equaling 1. For example, in the case of unit elasticty, 
the price of Bourbon (X) may increase by 3% and, 
correspondingly, the purchase of Bourbon would decrease by 
3% (%). An elasticity less than 1, known as inelastic
demand, would occur if a change in the cost of Bourbon
16
(e.g., 3% increase) was proportionately larger than the
change in purchase (e.g., 2% decrease) so that the actual 
total expenditure increases. Finally, elastic demand (£. > 
1) would occur if the purchase of bourbon decreased (e.g., 
4% drop in sales) disproportionately to an increase in 
price (e.g., 3%). Elasticity is independent of the units 
in which quantity and price are measured; hence, changes in 
"consumption" of qualitatively different reinforcers can be 
compared as prices increase. Before addressing the 
question of elasticity as a function of concurrent choices 
of a different nature, additional considerations must be 
dealt with.
The elasticity of demand in animal studies has been 
shown to be a function of the substitutability of 
reinforcers (e.g., Hogan, Kliest, & Hutchings, 1970; Lea & 
Roper, 1977; Shettleworth, 1972) Substitutable concurrent 
sources of reinforcers (e.g., root beer and Tom Collins 
mix) have shown greater elasticity relative to less 
substitutable reinforcers (e.g., food and root beer) as a 
function of price increases for one member of the commodity 
pair (Kagel, Battalio, Rachlin, Green, Gasmann, & Klemm, 
1975) . For example, since two sweet drinks are intuitively 
more substitutable for each other than are water and food, 
increasing the price of root beer will decrease its
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"purchases" (demonstrating elasticity), and increase the 
consumption of Tom Collins mix. On the other hand, the 
subject would be less inclined to purchase a less 
substitutable alternative to root beer (e.g., food), 
thereby demonstrating inelasticity, or at least less 
elasticity.
Most pairs of responses or commodities would be 
somewhere between the extremes of complete substitutablity 
and complete nonsubstitutability. Seemingly
nonsubstitutable items such as food and clothing may be 
substitutable to a certain extent. Food is substitutable 
for clothing to the extent that food provides warmth when 
eaten in large quantities (Rachlin et al., 1976). A pair 
of responses or commodities may be more accurately 
described as differing along a continuum of 
substitutability than being considered as substitutes and 
nonsubstitutes. However, for convenience, a pair of 
responses that are less substitutable than another pair of 
responses will be termed nonsubstitutes and substitutes, 
respectively.
The conservation model can be adapted to deal with 
qualitatively different reinforcers to test the hypothesis 
that a certain dimension is conserved across schedule 
changes for both substitutable and nonsubstitutable
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responses. The conservation model, using a concurrent 
schedule of different contingent responses but identical 
instrumental responses differing only in duration, would be 
expressed as:
«i'll + + B;,!, + kjCj) . 0. + kiOci + kjO^j (5)
In this formula the fitting constants, Js.̂ and are now
associated with response s., in contrast to earlier 
formulations assigning K to response i. This is done in
order to scale two different responses, and relative
to identical responses, and thereby providing a
common means of comparison.
The demand for response or £ 2  ̂ as a function of its
own price, or % 2 f has been referred to thus far as
elasticity, but is more strictly own-price elasticity (Lea, 
197 8), The own-price elasticity equation for both 
contingent responses, separately, can be derived from the 
following equation provided by Samuelson (1974):
e = -{Z^Q2/ K Q ^  + Q2 )/2 1 -r + P2)/23} (6)
where and £ 2 is the quantity of good demanded across two 
periods of time or price levels. and ^2 are the price
levels fixed at different times. Each change in £ is 
related to the average P, namely (£^ + £ 2 )7 2 , and the 
change in £ is related to the average £, namely (£^ + 
£ 2 3 /2 . To apply the elasticity measure to the conservation
19
model, consider the following example. Suppose a 
concurrent schedule provides a choice between licking a 
saccharine tube ((%̂ ) or eating food pellets and
requires the subject to press a lever (1^ or l^) to obtain 
access to either response. As the instrumental response 
requirement increases (X^ or X^), the response of licking 
the saccharine tube and eating food pellets is termed 
and respectively. Letting 0=NC (amount of time spent
engaged in response Ç) and £-X (the instrumental response 
requirement to gain access to the contingent response) the 
own-price elasticity formula can be rewritten as:
- A n C/[(KC^ + NC3)/2]~ ^  I/[(I^ + Ig)/]] = own price
elasticity (7).
^ 2  HCg represent the amount of time spent in licking
the saccharine tube under the two different reinforcement 
schedules with instrumental response requirements, X^ and 
X g , respectively.
Cross-price elasticity would reflect the change of the 
consumption of eating food pellets as a function of the 
instrumental requirement for licking the saccharine tube. 
The cross-price formula can be expressed as;
A NC/MKCj + NC^)/23-^ A 1/1(1^ + = cross-price
elasticity (8)
where snd would represent the amount of time spent
20
in eating food pellets as a function of the "price" changes 
(1^ and Ig) associated with the alternative response of 
licking the saccharine tube.
The measure of elasticity used in conjunction with the 
conservation model provides an application of economic 
demand theory on tv/o acccounts. First, the elasticity of 
demand for a single response should be greater with a 
substitutable alternative relative to a nonsubstitutable 
one. The present experiment will attempt to test this 
prediction in the context of a human-choice situation using 
two different sets of games as substitutable and 
nonsubstitutable pairs of recreational activities. The 
opportunity to engage in the substitutable and 
nonsubstitutable game sets will be controlled through an 
instrumental response requirement of bar pressing. The bar 
pressing requirement serves as a price analogue and 
increases for only one member of the game pair over the 
course of the experiment. It is predicted that the demand 
for this member of the game pair will be more elastic for 
the substitutable than nonsubstitutable condition due to 
the more similar alternative available.
Since demand is a function of price, larger increases 
in price should act to decrease demand more than a smaller 
increase. The present experiment will explore this
21
hypothesis by varying the magnitude of the instrumental
response requirement (e.g., low and high rate increases for 
bar pressing across training sessions) to engage in the 
contingent responses (games).
Lastly, consistent with the conservation model, it is 
predicted that subjects will conserve the total amount of 
the dimension apportioned to Response i and responses 
and across the baseline and contingency sessions. More 
specifically, the conserved dimension associated with the 
bar press and game responses should remain more or less
constant as the instrumental requirement (price) of a 
single member of the game pair increases. The parameter
respresenting the conserved dimension (k^) coupled with
baseline and contingency parameters measured 
experimentally, will enable the model to predict either 
dependent variable (e.g., or ^ 2 ^' given the numerical 
value of the other dependent variable.
Experiment 1 
Method
Subjects. Forty-eight subjects, enrolled in an
Experimental Psychology course, participated in order to 
fulfill partial requirements for a course. Data of two 
subjects from a control group and one from an experimental 
group were replaced due to a computer malfunction.
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Apparatus. Two levers mounted on the opposite ends of a 
table served as the instrumental response manipulanda. 
When depressed, the levers initiated separate timers on a 
SWTP 6800 microcomputer system. The substitutable, 
contingent responses consisted of two games played on 
identical units (Merlin) manufactured by Parker Brothers 
Co. Subjects were instructed to play a game known as 
Mindbender on one unit and a game known as Echo on the 
other. The Mindbender game required subjects to use a 
process of trial and error to solve for a pattern of 
numbers selected by the game unit, thus requiring short­
term retention of their responses in order to solve a 
single game. The game Echo also required short-term memory 
in order to mimic a series of lights and tones on the 
unit's display. Since both games shared the use of short­
term memory, they were intuitively designated as 
substitutes.
The nonsubstitutable response pair consisted of the 
games Mindbender and 2V Bowling. The latter game is one of 
several available from the Home TV Programmer Studio II 
manufactured by RCA. In constrast to Mindbender which 
requires short-term memory, TV Bowling required the subject 
to exercise hand-eye motor coordination to operate the 
game's control unit that moved a bowling ball down the
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alley on the TV screen in order to knock down the bowling 
pins. To operate each game, a switch on a "power-box" 
attached to each game had to be moved to an "ON" position. 
These switches controlled the power supplied by the 
microcomputer and initiated independent timers recording 
the duration of responding to each game. Each lever-press 
and power-switch manipulandum contained two lights, green 
and red, to serve as a signal for the response's 
availability and nonavailability, respectively.
Design. The present experiment consisted of a 2 (game 
pair: substitutable or nonsubstitutable) X 3 (price shift:
high, low, or control) X 5 (sessions: Baseline 1,
Contingencies 1-3, and Baseline 2) design. Subjects were 
randomly assigned, 8 per group, to one of six treatments 
according to the type of game pair and magnitude of price 
shift across sessions: (1) substitutable/low shift (SL) .
(2) substitutable/high shift (5Ü), (3)
substitutable/control (S£)f (4) nonsubstitutable/low shift 
(EL) , (5) nonsubstitutable/high shift (M) / and (6)
nonsubstitutable/control (EC). The dependent variables 
consisted of own- and cross-price elasticity measures in 
addition to the number of times each game was selected. 
In addition, a questionnaire was given upon the conclusion 
of the experiment, asking subjects to indicate how similar
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the games were along a 5 point continuum, with 1 being very 
similar and 5 very dissimilar.
Procedure.
Paired Baseline. Each subject was seated in front of 
the four manipulanda— the two lever presses and power- 
switch/game-set combinations. The subjects were
instructed;
Before you are four response alternatives— two lever 
presses and two power-switches which control the game 
units (The experimenter pointed to each of the items, 
demonstrated the use of the lever presses and games, 
and then allowed the subject to play each of the games 
for approximately 1 min ) . You may respond to any of 
the four alternatives when their green light is 
illuminated. You can not respond to an alternative if 
its red light is illuminated. Please remain seated 
throughout the experiment. Do you have any questions 
about these directions?
The onset and offset of the 15 min baseline session was 
signalled by a short 0.5 sec and 2.0 sec tone, respectively. At 
the onset of each baseline session all four manipulanda signalled 
availability via illumination of the green lights. Access to the 
responses was maintained for one-minute discrete trials. At the 
end of each minute the manipulanda signalled unavailability for 3 
sec and the response durations for each alternative were recorded 
by the microprinter before the cycle continued.
Contingency sessions. The baseline session was followed 
immediately by an initial contingency session. In this session, 
game participation was contingent upon the subject depressing the
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lever for 1 sec before gaining access to either game. At the 
start of each contingency session, the subject was to respond to 
one of two lever presses (X^ ot , Once the subject responded 
to either of the lever presses (e.g., X^), the other lever press 
(e.g, X 2 ) became unavailable for responding until the subject 
completed the instrumental and contingent response requirements 
on the chosen lever and game (e.g., Unavailability of the
lever press not chosen was signalled by the illumination of the 
red light on its manipulandum. Once the chosen instrumental 
response requirement had been completed, the appropriate power- 
switch/game combination became available, signalled by the 
illumination of its green light. The subject v/as allowed to play 
with the game for 60 sec before it became unavailable and a 
choice between the two lever presses was provided again. Each 
contingency session consisted of 15 one min cycles.
The second contingency session ensued 24-36 hrs later. The 
only change relative to the first contingency session was an 
increase in the instrumental requirements (3 or 6 sec) to gain 
access to the TY Bowling and Echo games. After a short two 
minute rest period, Contingency Session 2 was followed by a 
third, identical session with still another increase in the 
instrumental requirement (5 or 10 sec). Lacking no previous 
research to draw upon, the price shifts in the present experiment 
were based on data provided by several pilot subjects.
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The response requirement for the low shift subjects, across 
contingency sessions, was set at 1 sec (Contingency Session 1), 3 
sec (Contingency Session 2) , and 5 sec (Contingency Session 3) . 
The corresponding increases for the high shift were 1 sec, 6 sec, 
and 10 sec. Control subjects received only paired baseline 
sessions across all five phases. Table position of the games 
(left or right side) was counterbalanced across subjects. The 
microprinter recorded selection of the response alternatives for 
every one min cycle.
Results and Discussion 
According to the conservation model (Allison, 1976), the total 
amount of some dimension apportioned to an instrumental and 
contingent response is conserved across schedule changes for 
individual subjects. Hence, if the parameters, reflecting the 
conserved dimension, could be estimated, it should be possible to 
predict the number of choices made for a particular game (for any 
training session) by rearranging Equation (5) and inserting the 
known parameters. To test the accuracy of such predictions, it 
is necessary to compare the obtained and predicted choices for 
Game One (Mindbender) and Game Two (Echo or TR Bowling) . If the 
conservation model is correct, and does not vary widely across 
schedules, the predicted game choices of Equation (5) should have 
a high correlation relative to the obtained choices. Estimates 
of and k.2 v/ere calculated by using Equation (5) to set the
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initial baseline values equal to Contingency Sessions 1 and 2 as 
follows:
Contingency 1 Baseline 1
Nl'Il + klCl' + Mz'Iz + = 0  ̂ + kiOci +
Rearranging,
k l ' V l  - °C1> + kz'HzCz - °C2> = °1 - «ill - «2^2 (9a) 
Contingency 2 Baseline 1
^3^^3 + N^(I^ + kgC^) = 0^ + + kgO^g
Rearranging,
kl'«3'=3 - °C3> + k^tN^C^ - Oc,) . 0. - N3 I3 - N4 I, (9b) 
Equations (9a) and (9b) were used to form simultaneous 
equations to derive unique and values. Since the obtained 
number of game choices for the initial baseline through the 
second contingency session (choices , . . ,JŜ ) were used to
estimate the parameters, only the number of choices for the
last contingency session (M^, Game Two choices, e.g., TV Bowling
or Echo; Ng, Game One choices, e.g., Mindbender) were independent 
of the data. Predictive equations for Contingency 3 were 
obtained by rearranging Equation (5) and inserting the k^ values 
to solve for fjg and E g .
The correlations between the obtained and predicted game 
choices for the third contingency session were. Eg (r = 0.727) 
and Eg (r = 0.760). Both correlations proved to be significant.
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Egf 2(31) = 3.98, E < .05; Ug, 2(31) = 4.23, £  < .05. The
proportion of variance for the predicted scores accounted for by 
the obtained scores was Eg (r^ = 0.528) and Hg (r^ = 0.578). The 
slope/intercept for both games were , 0.80/1.44 and I3g,
0.94/0.02. The foregoing analyses provide some support for the 
premise that the subject conserves a dimension apportioned to the 
instrumental and contingent responses across sessions. Possible 
variation in the Jî  parameters across schedules could account 
for the lack of higher correlations between obtained and
predicted choices. It is possbile, of course, to obtain a
significant linear correlation between the predicted and obtained 
scores without necessarily having accurate predictions. To 
exclude the possibility that the predicted scores are linearly 
related but differ from the obtained scores by a constant amount, 
additional analyses were performed.
If the predictions were totally accurate, the differences 
between the predicted (PR) and obtained (̂ ) choices should be 
zero (e.g., Xd*0) . The mean difference score for the Game Two 
(Eg) and Game One (Ng) choices were Xd = 0.454, 2(31) = 1.51, p > 
.05, and Xd = -0.224, 2(31) = -0.84, p > .05, respectively.
These analyses indicate that the mean difference score did not 
significantly differ from zero.
The parameters used in the calculations to predict both 
sets of game choices were estimated on an individual basis. The
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mean Jî  and jig values for each experimental condition are 
presented in Table 1. In addition, the mean for predicted and 
obtained choices for both Eg and Eg/ across experimental groups, 
are presented in Table 2.
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE
Turning now to the economic issues, it was predicted that the 
groups receiving the substitutable pair of games should
demonstrate more elasticity of demand (e.g., greater % change in 
contingent responding relative to % change in the instrumental 
requirement) than the nonsubstitutable group. Specifically, the 
substitutable group should choose to play with Mindbender more 
often than Echo as the latter game's price increases compared to 
subjects in the nonsubstitutable condition experiencing an
identical price increase for TV Bowling. In addition,
differences between high and low price shifts were examined by 
comparing performances across changes in reinforcement schedules.
To examine the amount of time spent on Game Two as a direct 
function of price, own-price elasticity measures were calculated 
for each subject in the experimental conditions (see Equation 7). 
The elasticity measure affords an index of the rate of change in 
responding across sessions for each subject rather than relying 
on absolute differences to detect group differences. Subjects in 
the control conditions were not required to perform the
instrumental response for access to either game; consequently,
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their data were omitted from this conversion to elasticity scores 
due to the obvious absence of a price requirement,
A 2 (game pair: substitutable or nonsubstitutable) X 2 (price
shift: high or low) X 3 (sessions: Baseline 1 to Contingency 1,
Contingency 1 to Contingency 2, and Contingency 2 to Contingency 
3) ANOVA was employed to examine the computed elasticity scores. 
Mo factors were significant (all e 's > .10). The mean elasticity 
scores, collapsed across groups, per session were -0.23 (Baseline 
1 to Contingency 1), -0.02 (Contingency 1 to Contingency 2), and 
0.54 (Contingency 2 to Contingency 3), indicating that the 
percentage decrease in responding for Game Two (Echo or TV 
Bowling) was less than the percentage increase in the bar press 
requirement (price) across sessions (inelastic demand). This 
finding does not support the predicted performance differences 
between groups receiving the nonsubstitutable and subsitutable 
games or any differences as a result of high and low price 
shifts.
Corresponding to the own-price elasticity measures on Game 
Two, cross-price elasticity scores (see Equation 8 ) were 
calculated for individual response times on Game One (Mindbender) 
to determine their change as a function of increases in price on 
Game Two. The AMOVA for the Game One cross-price elasticity 
measures revealed no significant effects (all p's > .10). This 
indicates that the cross-price elasticity measures for Game One
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and did not differ for substitutable and nonsubstitutable games 
or high/low price shifts.
Although the elasticity measure acts to reduce subject 
variablity by comparing rates of change rather than absolute 
differences between subjects' performances, another difficulty 
with experiments involving schedule changes may not be as easily 
circumvented. It is difficult to attribute the decline in the 
amount of responding for Game Two, Echo or IV Bowline. to price 
increases alone, due to the simultaneous reduction available in 
playing time as a consequence of the increased amount of time 
spent bar pressing. The different amounts of time available to 
engage in Game Two responding, as a function of different price 
shifts, may exaggerate any real decrement caused by these price 
changes. To circumvent this possible confound, individual
performances were analyzed based on the number of times Game Two 
(Echo or IV Bowline) was selected relative to the total number of 
Game One and Two selections per session (e.g., + E2' -^3/-3
+ Ü 4 / and I25/H5 + Eg). In effect, this transformation places 
choices within each session on a relative scale, allowing 
comparisons with the control groups. These calculations for the 
control groups could present a further problem in that baseline 
sessions allowed responding to both games within each one minute 
interval. Close inspection of the data, however, revealed that 
subjects responded to either one game or the other on an almost
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exclusive basis for each one minute baseline interval.
It is assumed that the predicted differences between 
substitutable and nonsubstitutable conditions and differences 
between groups receiving high and low price shifts should hold 
for the selection proportion measures. Figure 1 shows the number 
of choices for Game Two relative to the total number of both game 
choices for each session. Although there appears to be a 
predicted decline in choices across Sessions 2-3 for the 
experimental groups, £L, HL, £iif and rjHf the high shift groups 
show an unexpected increase in Game Two choices for the last 
contingency period (Session 4) despite another increase in price. 
The control group shows a vacillation in Game Two choices 
across sessions as might be expected if subjects were merely 
alternating between Game One and Game Two. Group ££ demonstrated 
a slight decreasing trend in Game Two responding across Sessions
2-4. This is unexpected since Group was not subject to price 
constraints.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
A 2 (game pair) X 3 (price shift) X 5 (session) ANOVA 
performed on Game Two responses seen in Figure 1 indicated only a 
marginally significant Group X Session interaction, F(20, 168) = 
1.57, p < .07. All other effects were nonsignificant (all p's < 
.30) . This single trend toward significance coupled with the 
lack of consistent performance differences between
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substitutable/nonsubstitutable and high/low shift conditions in 
Figure 1, does not support the predicted differences based on the 
substitutability of the game pair or high/low price increments. 
Corresponding results for Game One selection proportions were not 
analyzed in that these data are exact complements of the Game Two 
proportions and would not have yielded any additional 
information,
Own-price elasticity measures were also analyzed for the 
selection proportions adjusted for income effects. The results 
of a 2 (game pair) X 2 (price shift) X 3 (session) ANOVA revealed 
only a significant main effect for the change in elasticity 
across sessions, F(2,22) = 5.02, p < .01. The change across
sessions. Baseline 1-Contingency 1, Contingency 1-2, and 
Contingency 2-3, was inelastic with mean elasticity measures of 
0.02, -0.01, and 0.29, respectively. A Tukey post-hoc comparison 
test showed the elasticity mean of 0.29 to be significantly 
different from the other two means (both p's < .05) . The first 
two means did not differ from each other (p > .10). This finding 
reflects an inelastic demand, indicating that, collapsed across 
the type of game pair and magnitude of price change variables, 
the percentage of decrease in Game Two responding across sessions 
is less than the corresponding percentage increase of the 
instrumental requirement. The significant difference among the 
mean elasticity measures across sessions also indicates that the
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elasticity of demand does not remain constant but becomes more 
elastic as price increases.
The results describing the economic variables in the foregoing 
analyses portray somewhat of an unclear picture. The 
classification of substitutes and nonsubstitutes appears to be 
ineffective in the context of the foregoing experiment. This is 
further corroborated by the subjects' self-report scales, 
indicating how similar they judged the two games. Subjects 
judged both game sets along the 5 point continuum as having more 
dissimilar than similar characteristics (X substitute = 3.5; X 
nonsubstitute = 4.0; i(46) = 1.85, 2  > .05). This may explain 
the highly inelastic demand for Game Two, in that the games were 
interpreted as dissimilar regardless of their designated level of 
substitutability; hence. Game One may not have been substitutable 
enough to promote elastic responding. This suggests that 
increasing the similarity of a game pair may promote greater 
performance distinctions for the substitutability manipulation.
The results of the high/low price shift were also equivocal. 
Although the elasticity analysis performed on the selection 
proportions give some credence to the effectiveness of the price 
manipulation, comparisons between experimental and control groups 
make such a conclusion less clear. It is feasible that larger 
increments in cost were needed to make the difference in price 
shifts more discernible.
35
Experiment 2 involves a test of the foregoing hypotheses. 
Specifically, it is predicted that an increase in the similarity 
of the substitutable game pair will promote more elastic 
responding for Game Two relative to subjects receiving a 
nonsubstitutable game pair. In addition, larger price increments 
relative to Experiment 1 should act to create greater elasticity 
of demand for Game Two relative to a control group. These 




Subjects, Thirty-two subjects enrolled in an Introductory 
Psychology course participated in order to fulfill partial 
requirements for a course.
Apparatus, The same general apparatus employed in Experiment 1 
V7as used here. Modifications involved a change in games. The 
substitute pair consisted of Merlin Blackjack and 2Y Blackjack 
played on the same units described in Experiment 1. The Merlin 
Blackjack game differed from the similar TV game in that the 
subject was not to exceed 13 cumulative points per game rather 
than the usual 21, The nonsubstitute pair consisted of Merlin 
Blackjack and 2% Bowling.
Design. The present design was similar to Experiment 1 with 
changes only for price shifts. In this experiment, only a single
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succession of price shifts occurred for each experimental 
subject, e.g., a 2 (game pair: substitutes or nonsubstitutes) X
2 (price shift: experimental or control) X 5 (sessions: Baseline 
1, Contingencies 1-3, and Baseline 2) design.
Procedure. The same general procedure was followed in the second 
experiment relative to Experiment 1; only the price shift for 
Game Two was changed for the experimental groups. The new
instrumental response requirement was set at 1 sec for 
Contingency 1, 10 sec for Contingency 2, and 20 sec for
Contingency 3. The instrumental response requirement for Game
One was fixed at 1 sec across all contingency periods. 
Completion of the instrumental requirement enabled the subject to 
engage in 1 min of playing time for the respective games. 
Subjects in the control groups received free baseline sessions 
across all training phases. Finally, the same questionnaire 
gauging subjects' perceived game similarity given in Experiment 1 
was repeated upon the conclusion of Experiment 2.
Results and Discussion 
The conservation model hypothesizes that a subject will 
conserve some unspecified dimension apportioned to an
instrumental and contingent response, and that this weighted sum 
of activities will be constant across schedules. If this 
relation is true, the parameters in Equation (5) should remain 
relatively stable across training sessions in the present
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experiment. Hence, it should be possible to predict the dependent 
variable (Game choices: . ,Ug) by rearranging Equation (5)
and substituting in the known parameters. In order to test these 
predictions, it was necessary to calculate and JI2 values for 
each subject (see Equations 9a and 9b) as previously described in 
Experiment 1. These parameters were then used in conjunction 
with Equation (5) to predict the number of choices made for both 
games (e.g., Game Two choices— TV Bowling or TV Blackjack;
and Ug, Game One choices— Merlin Blackjack) during the last 
contingency session for the experimental groups. If the 
dimension was indeed conserved, then the correlations between the 
predicted and obtained game choices should be high. The mean 
and k.2 values for both experimental groups is reported in Table
3.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
In light of the smaller sample size relative to Experiment 1, 
i-tests were used to examine the relationship between the 
predicted and obtained game choices (Bruning & Kintz, 1968). The 
correlation between the predicted and obtained choices for Games 
Two and One during the last contingency session were Eg (r = 
0.260) and Eg (r = 0.687), respectively. A close inspection of 
the data revealed that the low correlation between predicted and 
obtained choices for both games was due substantially to the 
performance of the nonsubstitutable group. The correlation
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between the predicted and obtained choices for both games were 
also computed for the substitute, Hg (r = 0.910) and Eg (r = 
0.845), and nonsubstitute. Eg (r = -0.03) and Eg (r = 0.196), 
conditions, separately. The mean number of obtained and 
predicted choices for both experimental groups are shown in Table
4.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The correlations for the substitute groups were significant, 
Egr t(6 ) = 8.21, a < .01 and Eg, i(6 ) = 5.91, e < .01. The
amount of variance in the predicted scores accounted for by the
2obtained scores in the substitute condition was. Eg (r = 0.828) 
2and Eg (r = 0.714). The slope/intercept for the predicted and 
obtained scores were. E g , .789/2.13 and Eg, .793/.926. The 
corresponding analyses for the nonsubstitute condition were not 
performed due to the obvious lack of relationship between the 
predicted and obtained scores.
As in Experiment 1, the difference scores between the
predicted and obtained choices were compared to the obtained
choices alone for the substitute condition (e.g., PR-0 vs. Û).
If the predicted choices were entirely accurate the mean for the 
difference scores for both games should be zero (e.g., Xd = 0). 
The mean difference score for Game Two (Xd = 0.945) did not 
significantly differ from zero. Eg, 1(7) = 1.86, p > .05. The 
mean difference score for Game One (Xd = 1.33), however, did
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significantly differ from zero, Ug, ĵ (7) = 3.44, e  < .05. This 
latter finding suggests that, despite the previously reported 
significant linear relationship between predicted and obtained 
choices, the scores do differ by some constant amount.
The lack of correspondence between the obtained and predicted 
choices for the nonsubstitutable condition is particularly 
noteworthy. It may be that under the more stringent price
constraints of Experiment 2, relative to Experiment 1, the nature
of the game pair becomes more important in its effects on the 
conserved dimension, jî . The explanation of this effect remains 
unclear, however, except to suggest that the unit-free dimension 
apportioned to the instrumental and contingent response may not 
be conserved (e.g., Jî  parameter may be less stable) with
nonsubstitutable response pairs compared to substitutable ones 
under high prices. The apparent superiority of the model to deal 
with substitutable alternatives must be interpreted cautiously in 
light of the finding that the mean of the Game One difference 
scores (e.g., £E“Ü) significantly differs from zero, indicating 
that, although the predicted and obtained scores are linearly 
related, there is not a one to one correspondence.
Focusing upon the economic variables, it was predicted that 
the subjects receiving the more substitutable game pair would 
show less responding to Game Two, relative to the subjects 
receiving the nonsubstitutable pair. In order to test this
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prediction and examine any changes in elasticity (e.g., % change 
in Game choices relative to the % change in price) across 
contingency sessions, the data from the present experiment were 
subjected to the same analyses as in Experiment 1. Own-price 
elasticity measures were calulated for each subject based on the 
time spent on Game Two, ^  Bowling or 2% Blackjack. A 2 (game 
pair) X 4 (session) ANOVA performed on these measures revealed no 
significant effects (all p's > .30). The mean scores across 
sessions, however, indicated a more elastic demand than in 
Experiment 1. The mean elasticity scores collapsed across the 
game condition were 0.10 (Baseline 1-Contingency 1), 0.08
(Contingency 1-2), 0.05 (Contingency 2-3), and 0.68 (Contingency
3-4) . The corresponding cross-price elasticity measures for Game 
One, Merlin Blackjack. were subjected to an identical ANOVA with 
no effects achieving significance (all p's > .10).
To counteract any possible confound due to less playing time 
as a result of increased time spent bar pressing as discussed in 
Experiment 1, the number of Game Two choices were examined in 
relation to the total number of choices made for both Game One 
and Two per session. This proportion measure was calculated for 
all groups across sessions. Baseline 1 to Baseline 2. It was 
predicted that subjects in the substitutable condition would make 
fewer Game Two choices across price increments compared to 
subjects in the nonsubstitutable condition, and the experimental
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groups would show a decrease in responding relative to control 
groups.
The Game Two proportion of choices are depicted in Figure 2. 
Both nonsubstitute and substitute experimental groups, E and 
evidence a sharp decrease in Game Two choices between Session 2 
(Contingency 1) and Session 3 (Contingency 2) . The substitute 
group, however, did make fewer Game Two selections than the 
nonsubstitute group during Session 4 (Contingency 3) , as 
predicted, despite a further increment in price. The decline in 
the proportion of Game Two choices for the control group EC at 
Session 4 was unexpected and makes any distinction between the 
substitute and nonsubstitute experimental groups equivocal. 
Despite the apparent group differences in the proportion of 
choices, a 2 (game pair) X 5 (session) ANOVA revealed no 
significant effects for Game Two selections (all p's > .25), Due 
to the nature of the present proportion measure. Game One 
proportions would yield the exact complement of Game Two 
proportions and therefore remained unanalyzed.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Own-price elasticity measures were also computed for the Game 
Two selection proportions across sessions. More elastic 
responding was predicted for the substitute condition relative to 
the nonsubstitute condition. A 2 (game pair) X 4 (session) ANOVA 
performed on the elasticity data revealed no significant effects
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(all e 's > .10). Consistent with the findings from Experiment 1, 
the Game Two proportions showed inelastic responding across 
sessions. The mean elasticity measures, collapsed across groups, 
were 0.01 (Baseline 1 to Contingency 1), 0.04 (Contingency 1 to 
Contingency 2), and 0.01 (Contingency 2 to Contingency 3). No 
diferences between the substitute and nonsubstitute conditions 
can be confirmed from this analysis.
The post-experimental questionnaire indicated that subjects 
across conditions differed only moderately in their estimation of 
the games' degree of similarity/dissimilarity (X, substitute = 
2.92; X, nonsubstitute = 3.30, i(30) = 1.05, £ > .05). As in 
Experiment 1, the lack of a greater perceived difference between 
game conditions may account for the lack of a clear statistical 
separation between substitute and nonsubstitute conditions. This 
methodological problem and the lack of effective price 
constraints will be discussed later in detail.
Discussion
The basic premise of the conservation model is that the 
weighted sum of activities in a situation is constant across 
schedule contraints (Staddon, 1979a). This premise is given 
some support by the correlation analyses for experimental groups 
in Experiment 1 and the experimental group receiving the 
substitute condition in Experiment 2. The correlation between 
predicted and obtained choices in both instances was significant.
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The lack of even higher correlations in Experiment 1 between 
the obtained and predicted choices for both games suggest that 
the conserved dimension between the instrumental and contingent 
responses, may change across schedules of reinforcement. The 
sèvere breakdown in correlations between the predicted and 
obtained values for game choices in Experiment 2 may be even more 
damaging to the conservation assumption of stable parameters. 
It will be recalled that the correlation for the predicted and 
obtained game choices was particularly low for the nonsubstitute 
groups when compared to subjects receiving the substitutable pair 
of games. The conservation model does not account for any 
differences in predictions based on the degree of 
substitutability of concurrent choices, although such a 
modification of the conservation model would be possible. To be 
sure, any distinction made on the basis of the game pair's 
substitutability is even more equivocal in light of the linear, 
yet inaccurate predictions for Game One substitute choices in 
Experiment 2,
It could be argued that certain implicit procedural 
assumptions of the conservation model were violated, thus 
accounting for the lack of stronger correlations in both 
experiments. The typical conservation procedure requires the 
subject's responding to conform to some preestablished criteria 
during a particular training session before being transferred to
Là
the next session (see Shapiro & Allison, 1970) . The lack of any 
explicit "stability criteria" in the present experiments could be 
viewed as an omission of an important procedural ingredient. 
Pilot data, however, indicated that subjects consistently 
alternated between games during baseline conditions. Hence, it 
was assumed that a baseline of long duration would not result in 
a bias for one game over the other. Consequently,the present 
baseline was considered suitable to establish the subjects' 
characteristic responding.
It could also be argued that the Jî  parameter calculations in 
both experiments differ from the usual method of derivation (see 
Shapiro & Allison, 197 8) possibly accounting for any low 
correlations between predicted and obtained choices. The very 
premise of the conservation model would seem to offset this 
argument in that the dimension which these very parameters 
represent is supposed to remain relatively stable across such 
sessions; hence, the present equations should be consistent with 
the conservation model's assumptions. A possible explanation 
for the low correlations for the nonsubstitutable group choices 
in Experiment 2 is that the higher price changes interacted with 
the nature of the game pair. That is, in Experiment 1 when the 
price changes were less severe, the conserved dimension remained 
somewhat stable across sessions, making for high correlations 
between obtained and predicted choices. Under the more stringent
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Experiment 2 price changes, however, the conserved dimension may 
be subject to greater change when choices are nonsubstitutable, 
thus accounting for the low correlations. In essence, the 
generality of the conservation model in dealing with diverse 
contingent responses, especially across stringent schedule 
constraints, is in need of further examination.
Leaving the discussion of the present results for the moment, 
it may be of value to consider the conservation model in 
juxtaposition to other approaches of a similar nature. The 
conservation model belongs to a general class of theories that 
have been categorized as of the equilibrium tvoe (Staddon, 
1979b). In operant equilibrium theories, behavior is explained 
by reference to a set of conditions that it must satisfy. For 
example, conservation theory states that subjects behave as to 
conserve a quantity which is a linear combination of the rates of 
performance of the instrumental and consummatory responses (Lea, 
in press) . This can be contrasted to the more mechanistic 
approaches in which behavior is explained in terms of antecedent 
causal relations (e.g., Hull, 1943; Spence, 1960; Killeen, 1975).
Akin to the conservation theory are a subclass of equilibrium 
theories known as optimality analyses (see Staddon, 1979b). 
Optimality analyses assume that an organism attempts to maximize 
some variable while operating under various constraints. 
Staddon, for example, has suggested that this maximized variable
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might take the form of net energy intake as in optimal foraging 
studies (e.g., Krebs, 1973).
Staddon has presented such an optimality-type theory that 
could serve as an alternative to the conservation model. Staddon 
assumes that the functional relations between the equilibrium 
levels of an instrumental and contingent response, under 
different schedules, conform to an homeostatic rule. This rule 
asserts that organisms act to minimize the model between their 
distribution of responses occurring in a "free" situation 
compared to the same activities under schedule conditions. This 
approach seems to handle the conservation data, and at the same 
time predicts performances that are disparate to the conservation 
models predictions (Mazur, 1975).
Lea (in press) has discussed a general theory that 
incorporates aspects of both the conservation model and the 
approach suggested by Staddon. Lea criticizes conservation 
theory's implication that the subject will be equally satisfied 
with a condition so long as the value that is conserved, k, is 
maintained. Lea postulates a utility variable (ji) to replace k 
in the conservation model. According to Lea, the variable ü  
assesses the subject's "satisfication." Like Staddon, Lea
assumes that the paired baseline condition represents some sort 
of ideal, and the nearer the subject is to it, the higher the 
satisfication.
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A major difference between the conservation model and the one 
proposed by Lea is that conservation specifically allows for the 
fact that the instrumental response and both consummatory 
responses substitute for one another in some sense under a 
concurrent-schedule. Lea's model, on the other hand, treats 
these responses as independent contributors to utility. In light 
of the conservation model's present difficulty in dealing with 
the nonsubstitutable alternatives relative to the substitutable 
ones in Experiment 2, the alternative mdoel proposed by Lea may 
in fact, be better equipped to explain the present data in that 
the value conserved does not appear to be invariant across 
schedules as the conservation model supposes. Lea (personal 
communication) has proposed a test of this very assumption by 
examining the conservation theory across several different 
schedules' combinations. If the k parameters of the model are 
always the same or vary only randomly about the mean, then the 
conservation model's assertion of relatively stable k's is 
correct, but if they vary systematically with schedule 
constraints, then the model is wrong.
In addition to possible variations in the conserved dimension 
across schedules, there are other difficulties in using the 
conservation model in the present instance. The present 
experiments attempt to extend a model developed from data 
generated from infrahuman subjects. The control of extra-
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experimental sources of reinforcement may be critical for the 
success of the conservation model to more efficiently prevent 
satiation of the experimental sources. On this account, 
extrapolating the model to human behavior is, of course, a 
problem and satiation and fatigue factors need to be adequately 
controlled. The present experiment was conducted over two 
separate training sessions for each subject in an attempt to 
attenuate such factors, however, the responding of the control 
subjects would suggest a need for sessions of shorter durations 
extended over a longer period of time. Another difficulty in 
applying the conservation model to human choice-behavior concerns 
the nature of the response alternatives. The conservation model 
has dealt only with the relationship between essential 
commodities (e.g., food, water). There is some data to indicate 
that the predictions of the conservation model are at odds with 
studies dealing with non-essential commodities (Kagel, personal 
communication). Whether this model is adequate to deal with 
choices between non-essential responses as in the present 
experiment will require further investigation.
Turning nov? to the economic issues, the present studies 
demonstrate a need for methodological refinements in dealing with 
the issue of substitutability. The present study relied on an 
intuitive classification scheme to establish substitutable and 
nonsubstitutable repsonses. The absence of any consistent
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differential effect for the type of responses, substitutable and 
nonsubstitutable, in any of the performance measures would argue 
against repeating such a procedure. This isolated deficiency is 
suggestive of a more general problem in dealing with the
substitutablity issue.
It appears that at present there is no proven way of
specifying the substitutabiilty of responses on an a, priori 
basis. Despite the successful use of this variable in some 
operant experiments, the proof of the effectiveness of the 
classification scheme specifying substitutability on an intuitive 
basis can only be judged in a post-hoc fashion (e.g., Rachlin et 
al., 1976). That is, the validity of the method of 
classification can only be ascertained by differential effects in 
the data that has already been accumulated. This problem is
closely related to the circularity issue of reinforcement 
discussed previously,
Rachlin et al. (1976) have suggested a refinement to the
intutive approach of the substitutability issue. By using 
Tverskey's (1972) elimination-by-aspects theory, these authors 
suggest that substitutability might be treated in terms of the 
ratio of common and unique aspects between choices. An alternate 
solution has been offered by Allison et al. (197 9) . These 
authors suggest that the dimensional parameter in the
conservation model could be viewed as a kind of substitutability
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constant. Illustratively, perfect (unit) substitutability would 
be exemplified when K = 1, meaning that i units of response i are 
substitutable for jji units of response Allison et al. also
elaborate as to how this technique can be used to predict the 
numerical value of Jt for two responses which have not yet been 
paired in a contingency schedule.
Despite the sophisticated discussion that the substitutability 
variable has achieved in the psychological literature (e.g., 
Allison, et al., 1979; Rachlin & Burkhart, 1979; Rachlin et al., 
1976) it is an issue inherent with many obstacles. The
substitutability issue, as treated to date, rests upon the law of 
transitivity holding for response or commodity pairs. That is, 
if two commodities were substitutable for a third commodity, then 
they should be substitutable for each other according to
traditional economic thought. There is some evidence that 
choices are not always transitive for infrahuman subjects
(ITavarick & Fantino, 1974) , and nonconformance to such
expectations by humans is well documented in the economic
literature as well (see Rachlin et al., 1976). Moreover,
substitutability as a property, in and of itself, is not
symmetric. For example cars will run on alcohol and in a case of 
extreme urgency Scotch whiskey could be used as a substitute for 
gasoline; however, guests at a cocktail party might violently 
object to the reverse situation (Lea, personal communication).
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The most fruitful solution to the substitutability issue in 
operant models may be to ignore it altogether. For instance. 
Lea's (in press) model has no parameters representing 
substitutability, yet it is sensitive to the extent to which two 
reinforcers contribute to characteristics of the model such as 
utility. Hence, although there is no one term in the model 
deserving of the title "substitutability", it does account for 
the effect that different types of reinforcers have on
responding.
Although the issue of substitutability appears to be an 
economic issue that is not easily translated into psychological 
terms, other economic variables may prove to be more easily 
grasped. The recent surge of interest in econometrics by various 
psychologists (e.g., Allison, 1979; Lea, 1978; Rachlin & 
Burkhart, 1978; Rachlin et al., 1976) has not been intended to 
determine how the economy works, but to suggest how choice- 
behavior may be viewed from an economic framework. After all, a 
consumer choosing between two commodities at certain prices bears 
strong similarities to a subject in an operant experiment 
responding to two schedules leading to different reinforcers. The 
finding of both experiments appear to indicate such a consumer­
like situation. There appears to be a general decline in 
responding to Game Two as a function of increments in the 
instrumental response requirement (price) supported by the
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selection proportion measures from both experiments. However,
occasional fluctuations in performance on the part of the control 
groups tends to obfuscate this conclusion.
The elasticity analyses in the present experiments indicated 
inelastic responding. To induce elastic responding in dealing 
with nonessential items it may be necesary to make a number of 
methodological changes in future studies. It may be that
subject's in the present study could not discern the changes in 
price as they occurred across sessions and still more stringent 
prices should be used. A more likely explanation for the highly 
inelastic demand is that the present instrumental response 
requirement may not translate easily as a price analogue. For a 
price analogue to be effective, subjects must value their
available purchasing resources. Although the present experiment 
used time as a resource, subjects may have lacked the necessary 
feedback to render this commodity its appropriate value. Without 
some kind of external referent such as a timer to index the 
amount of resources being "spent", the functional resouce may 
have been the effort to bar press alone. Bar pressing may be a 
resource that is too easily replenished, rendering it ineffective 
as a resource to be valued and thriftly spent. The most
effective experimental price analogue may be to use tokens as 
payment for work performed, which could then be exchanged for a 
variety of responses or commodities.
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The more recent use of economic demand theory as a model for 
certain aspects of operant choice-behavior does appear promising 
in light of the growing body of research demonstrating its profit 
as a heuristic tool (e.g., Allison, 1979; Lea & Roper, 1977; Lea, 
1978, in press; Rachlin & Burkhart, 1979; Rachlin et al,, 1976). 
Belatedly, studies of a more social nature have used operant 
methods to detail the conditions of cooperation which could also 
easily lend itself to an economic analysis (e.g.. Hake, Olvera, & 
Bell, 1975). Future work in developing economic analogies and 
social behavior might include such areas as bargaining, gambling, 
and coalition formation.
In using economic issues as analogues to psychological 
behavior, it should be understood that economic demand theory is 
not a theory in at least one sense. The demand curve for single 
commodity may have practically any shape and still be consistent 
with the theory (Lea, 1978) • Demand theory, however, does 
provide a framework within which particular theories can be 
developed for particular purposes. Conservation theory and other 
equilibriun theories may be of this general type. Demand theory 
may provide a mold in which these theories can be cast to study 
choice in a consistent manner. The reverse should also hold 
true. Theories discussed in the present article can serve as a 
basis for many econometric investigations that would provide 
laboratory support for many issues of long historical contention.
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NL SL NH SH
-0.11 0.54 0.92 0.61
-0.04 -0.10 0.13 1.06
Group means for Içj and values per 
experimental condition.
TABLE 2
NL SL NH SH
predicted
%
7.54 5.71 6.92 8.08
obtained 6.00 6.57 7.00 7.80
predicted
Ü6
5.01 5.73 6.31 3.29
obtai ned 6.14 5.57 5.50 4.14
Group means for predicted and obtained 
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Figure 1. Proportion of Game Two (Echo or 12 Bowling) 
choices across training sessions (Baseline 1, Contingencies 
1-3, and Baseline 2) per group (SC = Substitute Control, 
NC = Nonsubstitute Control, SL = Substitute Low, 
NL = Nonsubstitute Low, SH = Substitute High, and 
NH = Nonsubstitute High).
Figure 2. Proportion of Game Two (12 Blackjack or TV 
Bowling) across training sessions (Baseline 1, 
Contingencies 1-3, and Baseline 2) per group (SC = 
Substitute Control, NC = Nonsubstitute Control, S = 
Substitute, and N = Nonsubstitute).
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